Police officers patrol the favelas Mare complex, during an anti-crime operation in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, October 9, 2023. REUTERS/Pilar Olivares.
Crime, Justice & Safety
Democracy, Conflict, & Governance
Foreign Politics & Elections
Latin America & the Caribbean
*>:!text-medium">Editor"s note:
This piece is part of a series titled “Nonstate armed actors và illicit economies in 2024” from Brookings’s Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors.
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Over the past three decades, the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) has transformed from a prison gang founded in São Paulo into a transnational criminal “leviathan,” with a presence throughout South America, Africa, and Europe. In response to this growing threat, in 2021 the U.S. Government cited the PCC as “the most powerful organized crime group in Brazil & among the most powerful in the world.” What can we expect from the PCC moving forward? and how might policymakers stall this international expansion?
In the coming year, the PCC will likely continue khổng lồ vie for dominance in strategic areas of contested control throughout Brazil & look for opportunities to lớn consolidate gains abroad. Confrontation with rival groups, including the Comando Vermelho (CV), born in the Rio de Janeiro prisons, and its allies in areas such as the Amazon, is also likely to lớn continue. This is particularly the case due to lớn the region’s importance for drug smuggling và access to other illicit markets, such as illegal logging, mining, & wildlife trade.
Internationally, the PCC is likely khổng lồ become further entrenched in neighboring countries and continue to lớn probe opportunities for a direct presence in Europe, while at minimum maintaining profitable liên kết to groups such as Italy’s ‘Ndrangheta mafia. A more focused push into other parts of South America, including Uruguay, Argentina, & Chile, where prison capacity và experience fighting organized crime is limited, could propel the PCC’s consolidation of power in the region as well.
In considering the nature of the PCC’s growth, addressing this challenge will require both domestic policy changes và international coordination. Within Brazil, continued focus on hotspot areas, such as the Amazon, will be vital. In addition, the Lula administration should devise a federal strategy for addressing organized crime, which has typically been left lớn state authorities despite the national-level threat.
To address the PCC’s transnational expansion, Brazilian security personnel should deepen their collaboration with regional partners around organized crime. This issue could also provide an opportunity for the Brazilian government to lớn engage in productive collaboration with the United States & the European Union, particularly as the PCC endeavors to expand overseas into areas where Brazilian intelligence operations are less robust.
Beyond these approaches, it remains important khổng lồ address longstanding challenges that make cooperation with or participation in criminal groups an attractive option. These include efforts limiting pretrial detention, improving prison conditions, và addressing impunity within the security apparatus, among a range of other possible reforms.
The PCC’s continued expansion throughout Brazil
Born in 1993 in response to a brutal massacre in Carandiru prison in São Paulo, the PCC has since expanded to become a formidable global threat. With a presence in nearly every state in Brazil, the PCC has recruited tens of thousands of members, drawing on a prison population that has grown by more than 400% since 2000. Only the CV has a similar national scale, và in recent years, the PCC has wrestled control away from it in many parts of Brazil.
The PCC exerts control inside Brazil’s prisons & outside its walls, overseeing a complex governance system that involves not only explosive violence but also the imposition of discipline and order. In recent years, the PCC has pushed into the Amazon, where groups such as the Família bởi vì Norte và CV have historically vied for control. This contestation has resulted in high homicide rates và prison violence. Due lớn the fact that the Amazon offers the greatest potential for illicit activities — with proximity to suppliers in the northwest, transport routes to lớn ports in the northeast, vulnerable migrants from countries such as Venezuela in the north, & the potential for expansion into environmental crimes, such as illegal mining and fishing — it is likely to remain an area of PCC interest over the next year.
The PCC’s transnational agenda
Since the mid-2000s, the PCC has also pursued transnational ties. In addition to lớn providing a steady supply of marijuana và cocaine khổng lồ fuel domestic markets, this expansion seeks to stitch together all aspects of the drug supply chain, with Brazil’s roads, rivers, & ports providing the transport routes to lớn the Atlantic Ocean. To lớn this end, the PCC has linked drug producers in countries such as Bolivia, Peru, and Paraguay lớn drug suppliers across Europe & parts of Africa. It also worked khổng lồ recruit former FARC fighters who opted out of peace talks with the Colombian government. Through trans-Atlantic ties with Italy’s ‘Ndrangheta mafia & in West Africa, the PCC serves as an important intermediary for cocaine supplied to Europe.
For now, the PCC tends lớn plug into và collaborate with existing international networks, yet there is evidence the group may establish more robust local presences as well. According to lớn some estimates, PCC members have been identified in at least 16 countries, including an estimated 1,000 affiliates alone in Portugal. Continued collaboration with other illicit actors operating in parts of Europe and Africa is likely to remain a priority for the PCC, but efforts lớn build a presence on the ground, particularly in Lusophone countries, seem increasingly possible as well.
Lula’s approach to organized crime
According to pollster Datafolha, respondents consistently rank public safety in Brazil as a major problem. As a result, any eruptions in violence could dent Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s approval ratings and push voters toward more extreme politicians promising policies akin to lớn those seen in El Salvador.
To address this concern, Lula has attempted to reign in organized crime in a variety of ways. In the Amazon, he has worked lớn bolster cross-national coordination to lớn protect the rainforest. Although regional integration is a positive step, some critics have argued that these efforts vì chưng not go far enough in addressing environmental crimes.
Security personnel have also sought lớn decrease illegal logging và mining, with some success. However, there are already signs that lax enforcement has brought a resurgence in illicit activities khổng lồ the very areas that the Lula administration had prioritized last year. Furthermore, tensions in Congress tied to tư vấn for large regional development projects & agricultural expansion threaten to stymie further progress & drive illicit activity.
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Beyond the Amazon, Lula has retightened firearm restrictions, reversing policies that made it easier for criminal groups to procure weapons legally. Other efforts, however, amount to lớn little more than new funding for the same ineffective solutions. For example, the government recently announced the deployment of the armed forces to lớn key ports và airports khổng lồ reign in drug smuggling. This “guarantee of law và order” may lead to more drug apprehensions in the short term, but the root causes driving PCC expansion will remain intact.
Denting the PCC’s reach
Brazil continues khổng lồ have one of the highest prison population rates in the world và the third-highest number of prisoners. Prison occupancy levels are about 174%. As a result, any type of sweeping mass incarceration efforts to lớn curb organized crime would likely be counterproductive in Brazil, particularly given the PCC’s prison-based origins.
Instead, efforts khổng lồ improve conditions in prisons & decrease the prison population will help alleviate găng tay on a system that provides the best opportunities for PCC recruitment. Most recently, the National Council of Justice reviewed the cases of over 100,000 inmates & found that nearly 22,000 had been wrongfully imprisoned, resulting in their release. Further efforts in this vein will be vital. Additionally, investing more in rehabilitation programs & security so that inmates are not forced khổng lồ rely on gangs for their survival will also help decrease the pull factors inside Brazil’s prisons that drive PCC membership.
Given the PCC’s wide reach across Brazil — và internationally — cooperation & intelligence sharing also remain critical. At present, Brazilian states remain responsible for public safety, & the Brazilian federal government’s responses have so far been limited. As a result, it is difficult to coordinate across security operations, despite a national-level threat. A national-level strategy that facilitates communications & sets priorities could help create a long-term response to lớn public safety threats that extend well beyond state borders.
Internationally, coordination efforts could provide opportunities for productive collaboration with the United States and, the European Union due to lớn the PCC’s expansion into areas where the Brazilian government’s intelligence efforts & relationships are weaker. It will also be critical to lớn continue lớn invest in additional regional cooperation & capacity building, particularly in countries lượt thích Paraguay và Bolivia, where the ability to investigate organized crime is limited and law enforcement is corrupt.
More broadly, improving the public safety situation will require difficult reforms lớn tackle impunity within the security apparatus và regain the trust of populations that have historically been neglected by the state. Homegrown solutions, such as improvements in data usage to bản đồ crime or limitations on alcohol sales after 11 p.m., offer a blueprint for strategies that have worked — however, they take political will and time lớn succeed. In the interim, punitive solutions — which trade short-term political wins for long-term public safety — will likely exacerbate the PCC’s transnational challenge.
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Primeiro Capital Command (PCC) has emerged as Latin America’s biggest gang, with massive growth over three decades. There are an estimated 40,000 lifetime members và an additional 60,000 “contractors” that make up the gang. Last November, it was leaked that the group has 1,000 associates across the Atlantic in Lisbon, thousands of miles away. The gang has gone global.
The PCC was initially founded in August 1993 in the São Paulo jail Taubaté, as a response to lớn horrendous jail conditions. A year before, another São Paulo prison, Carandiru, had been stormed by police to lớn suppress a riot and 111 inmates were killed—some were shot to death và others mauled by police dogs. This shocking sự kiện was a catalyst khổng lồ the formation of the PCC. Taking control of Taubaté and other prisons begun as a way to protect the rights of prisoners & their criminal interests.
Membership draws from the Brazilian prison population, which has grown by more than 400% since 2000. Members of the PCC are known as “brothers” and effectively rule the communities they control. This includes so-called ‘trials’ where members judge cases and hand out sentences. They run a lot of Brazil’s favelas in their own parallel state. In places where the state was not present, it has become a type of government for the people there.
The PCC, largely considered a “jailhouse fraternity,” has spread across Latin America after its creation in 1993. It first spread around Brazil, even in remote parts of the Amazon, through drug markets, smuggling routes, shantytowns, and prisons. The PCC monopolizes São Paulo’s crime scene và dominates Brazil’s domestic drug market. It has quickly established major presences around the continent. In Paraguay, the gang is accused of a major armed heist including bombings & targeted assassinations to lớn collect about $8 million (approximately £6,278,800). In the past five years, the PCC has formed lucrative alliances with a variety of partners such as cocaine producers in Bolivia.
Not only has the PCC grown across South America, but it is on its way lớn a truly global organisation. It has strong link with the Serbian và Albania mafias, among others, but works mostly with Europe’s largest mafia, ‘Ndrangheta, which is based in Italy. The PCC has control of important traffic routes across the Atlantic, linking Brazil và Bolivia khổng lồ Europe và Africa. The PCC can be help partly responsible for the ‘tsunami’ of the cocaine market in Europe. A São Paulo prosecutor, Lincoln Gakiya, remarked, “If someone is using cocaine in France, England or Spain there’s a very good chance it got there through the hands of the PCC.” Gakiya also estimated the PCC makes around $1 billion a year (approximately £785,450,000). According to lớn the Economist, the PCC buys wholesale cocaine for $1,500 (approximately £1,178) per kilogram and in Europe, can sell a kilo for over $30,000 (approximately £23,564).
The gang is expanding its reach in Africa, particularly West Africa—a major transit zone for cocaine. In 2018, only one west African country, Senegal, made a danh sách of the top 10 destinations for cocaine seized in Brazilian ports. A year later, several others—Nigeria, Ghana, và Sierra Leone—had joined the list. Western Africa acts as the links between both ends of the cocaine supply chain, expanding the region’s role as a strategic transit point và increasing the spread and depth of illegal activity, on the whole. Not only has the PCC reached west Africa, but also South Africa as well. The country is key lớn continue to send coke even farther, into emerging Asian markets like India và China.
Apart from cocaine, the PCC has other new streams of revenue. Brazilian police report that they are responsible for a rise of digital crimes. These include Whats
App scams that fool millions of Brazilians a year. The PCC also has link with Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua, a human trafficking group và have adopted expanded interests, such as illegal goldmines in the Amazon. In Colombia, they have ties with ex-members of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to lớn provide training và weapons. In the area between Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, the group has link with Lebanese criminals (who authorities believe have connections with Hezbollah) to lớn launder money.
The United States government has labelled the PCC “the most powerful organized crime group in Brazil và among the most powerful in the world.” The group’s reach has spread worldwide và the nguồn the group holds is unparalleled. Because of this, there is real concern not only for the crime occurring but also for the future và how the PCC will interact with the Brazil và other states. The last hurdles in achieving a global mafia would be lớn infiltrate national politics & the local economies. Lincoln Gakiya believes that the PCC is already beginning to vày just that. Some fear that the PCC, as well as other gangs in Brazil, have the possibility khổng lồ recreate similar conditions of a 1990s Colombia or a more recent Mexico, with the gang effectively exerting unchecked control and corruption over the government.
One Swiss-based think tank, Global Initiative, suggests several actions to tackle the PCC problem: challenging their local legitimacy, reviewing and improving Brazil’s imprisonment system, và exposing collusion between the PCC và law enforcement. Nevertheless, the PCC poses a formidable challenge lớn stability and security in Brazil và beyond, with urgent actions needed lớn tackle this transnational syndicate.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author & do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs reviews team.
